

Ethics and Educational Research: A Theoretical Approach to its Understanding from the Dynamic Structure of Human Good

Ética e investigación educativa: aproximación
teórica para su comprensión desde la
estructura dinámica del bien humano

Ética e pesquisa educacional: aproximação
teórica para sua compreensão desde a
estrutura dinâmica do bem humano

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Abstract

This paper proposes a number of elements to understand the relationship between ethics and educational research from the philosophical perspective of Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1904-1984) in his ethics of achievement, specifically developing an analysis of the Dynamic structure of human good as a developing object, proposed by the Canadian philosopher in his book, *Topics in Education* (1998). This work reviews the three levels of that structure— the particular good as opposed to statistical evil, the good of order as opposed to structural evil, and the terminal value as opposed to cultural aberration—in two dimensions: on one hand, the orientation of the educational researcher activity in the process of knowledge building and, on the other, the analysis of the finality of educational research as a discipline that consists in the construction of new knowledge for the development of educational processes of the humanity of the future.

Keywords

ethics; educational research; ethics of science; professional education; humanism

Palabras clave

ética; investigación educativa; ética de la ciencia; formación profesional; humanismo

Resumen

Este artículo plantea elementos para la comprensión de la relación entre la ética y la investigación educativa desde la aportación filosófica de Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1904-1984) en su ética de la realización humana, desarrollando específicamente un análisis de la estructura dinámica del bien humano como objeto en desarrollo, propuesta por el filósofo canadiense en su obra *Filosofía de la educación* (1998). Se revisan los tres niveles de dicha estructura —el del bien particular, como opuesto al mal como fenómeno estadístico; el del bien de orden, como opuesto al mal estructural, y el del valor terminal, como opuesto al mal, entendido este en cuanto aberración de la cultura— en dos dimensiones: la de la orientación de la actividad del investigador educativo en el proceso de generación del conocimiento y la de la revisión de la finalidad misma de la investigación educativa como disciplina, cuyo bien interno consiste en la construcción de nuevo conocimiento para la mejora de los procesos de formación de la humanidad futura.

Resumo

Este artigo propõe alguns elementos para compreender a relação entre a ética e a pesquisa educacional desde a contribuição filosófica de Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904 - 1984) em sua ética da realização humana, desenvolvendo, especificamente, uma análise da estrutura dinâmica do bem humano como objeto em desenvolvimento, proposta pelo filósofo canadense em sua obra *Filosofia da educação* (1998). Revisamos os três níveis dessa estrutura —O bem particular em oposição ao mal como fenômeno estatístico; o bem da ordem em oposição ao mal estrutural; e o valor terminal em oposição ao mal, entendido como aberração da cultura— em duas dimensões: o norteamento da atividade do pesquisador educativo no processo de criação do conhecimento e a revisão da finalidade mesma da pesquisa educativa como disciplina, cujo propósito consiste na construção de novo conhecimento para o aprimoramento dos processos de formação da humanidade futura.

Palavras-chave

ética; pesquisa educacional; ética da ciência; formação profissional; humanismo

Invalid Procedures, Distorted Goals: The Double Problem of Educational Research Ethics

Scientific research, in general, and educational research, specifically, are amid a concerning milieu about the proliferation of what Aluja and Birke (2004) call ethically unacceptable behaviors and ethically questionable behaviors in knowledge generating processes.

These authors mention that in the last two decades, there has been an exponential increase in these types of violations to deontological research codes because of multiple factors, which not only stem from researchers' individual decisions, but from structural and even cultural situations:

Aluja and Birke (2004) define *ethically unacceptable behaviors* as “the violation of existing codes, norms or contracts”, and *ethically questionable behaviors* as “those that are outside of the ethical principles framework, which are expected but not formally established in codes or norms”(pp. 23 and 87). Based on an analysis of a significant number of international documents, they indicate three ethically unacceptable behaviors: plagiarism, data falsification, and data fabrication (Hirsch, 2016, p. 85).

According to this classification, the problem of ethics in scientific research, and specifically in the field of education, in educational research, manifests in behaviors that bluntly violate existing codes, norms, or contracts to regulate activity, such as applying procedures or criteria that would not be ethically expected, even if they are not explicitly written in a specific code or norm.

Hirsch (as cited in Martinson, Anderson, & DeVries) lists seven unethical behaviors in addition to the previous three: (1) falsify data; (2) omit aspects related to human participants requirements; (3) not make explicit the participation of companies whose products have to do with the project; (4) have relationships with students object of study or customers that are questionable; (5) use other people's ideas without their consent and without giving them credit; (6) use confidential information without permission; not present data that contradict the research; (7) not mention the use of flawed information or change the design, method, or results of a study to respond to pressures from those financing the study.

All of these behaviors reflect the ethical crisis of research because they evidence the use of invalid procedures in the knowledge building process. Behaviors like the aforementioned, for example, the manipulation or fabrication of data to achieve the conclusions expected from project funders, call into question researchers' work and even subtract credibility from the results.

This use of ethically invalid or questionable procedures overshadow research and its proliferation seriously calls into questions the relevance and trustworthiness of research in any field of knowledge, including education.

However, although the few existing studies on research ethics focus mainly on those behaviors that refer to procedure, the ethical problem in knowledge building goes beyond the behaviors of researchers since they are ultimately related to the research's social goals, essential to the development of all fields of human activity.

Although it is true that the careful use of ethically acceptable procedures in research work is very important, it is also necessary to ethically question the goals of the knowledge building process in terms of the collective and collaborative construction of human good, which is ultimately the objective of ethics as a philosophical discipline and of professional ethics as applied philosophy:

There is a distinction, well understood, but also a link between knowledge (to know) and ethics (duty). This link appears when the moral act is taken into account, not in isolation, but in its insertion and its consequences in the world (Morin, 2005, p. 40).

In his third volume of *The Method*, dedicated to knowledge, the French thinker Edgar Morin (1999) posits that the origin of the ethical crisis of science—and, in turn, research—is due to modernity's separation between factual and value judgement. This separation stemmed from a false notion of objectivity, understood as a total separation of the knowing subject from their knowledge, which generated an alienation of humanity regarding its own knowledge of the world that according to this author, must be fixed in our time.

From this separation, an autonomous science, policy, and art emerged, which led to a rupture in global ethics imposed by medieval theology.

The autonomy of science and other fields of human endeavor had positive consequences and enabled the rapid development of research, the emergence of methods pertaining to every discipline, and the complete development of all professional fields, with the subsequent progress in knowledge generation and its application through technology.

However, this rupture in global ethics also produced negative consequences because it generated an uncoordinated vision of every field and discipline as enclosed within itself and turned means into ends. This is how the vision of knowledge for knowledge's sake was developed; economic growth as an end in itself, access to political power as an end and not as a means to build social good, etc.

From this absolutization of the autonomy of disciplines and human spheres, emerged the ethical crisis, making increasingly evident the need to rearticulate factual judgement with value judgement, given that knowledge always entails consequences in terms of human and social good.

In this way, the problem of the relationship between ethics and research must be seen from the perspective of researchers' behaviors and procedures, which must be ethically valid, as well as from the reconceptualization of the research goal, not as an end in itself—knowledge for knowledge's sake—, but as a discipline whose internal good consists of providing society with new knowledge for the construction of humanity. In other words, for more just, equitable, democratic, inclusive, and peaceful societies (Hortal, 2002).

In the case of educational research, the problem of ethics consists of promoting the conditions for an ethically valid exercise of knowledge building in different aspects of education, understood as a complex phenomenon, and simultaneously, of reconceptualizing the goals of educational research. The latter is understood from the perspective of a discipline whose internal good consists of promoting a knowledge society based on a comprehensive human, shaping future generations with the goal of building fully human societies, which are worth living in.

To achieve this, it is required to have quality empirical research and theoretical developments contributing elements to rethink and rebuild the relationship between ethics and research in the educational field. Regarding theoretical contributions in professional ethics, in education in general, there is a lack of work outside of either the principles of ethics or principlism approaches developed for the professional and educational fields by Hortal (1995, 2002) and the ethics of dialogue by Cortina (2000a, 2000b).

In both perspectives—especially in principlism, which is the dominant focus in professional ethics research—the emphasis is fundamentally on the first aspect of the problem discussed in this section, in other words, on the behaviors and procedures that must guide the conduct of all professionals, but it does not generally tackle the second aspect, related to the goal, in the same level of detail.

In comparative terms with empirical research, it is possible to assert that there is a lack of work in theoretical development in professional ethics and value ethics, as is shown by recent States of Knowledge published by the Mexican Council of Educational Ethics (COMIE) in 2013.

The volume on education and values mentions that of the total research conducted from 2001-2011 in Mexico, approximately 5% has to do with philosophical and policy education contributions (Yurén & Hirsch, 2013).

In this scenario, theoretical work linking professional ethics and educational research is even scarcer.

Consequently, we posit the theoretical contribution of human thriving, building on the work of Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1998), and specifically, what he calls the dynamic structure of human good as an object under construction. He deals with the dual problem of the relationship between professional ethics and educational research.

Ethics in Educational Research: Notions and Components of Human Good Under Construction

The unavoidable fact is that we are continuously making value judgments, in other words, knowing values and living our lives on the basis of these values. We distinguish between good and bad schools, good and bad policies, honest and dishonest politicians, good and bad actions. We function in society on the bases of these values [...]. (Cronin, 2006, p. 5)

The theoretical work necessary to build a well-understood distinction, connected simultaneously to the link between knowledge (to know) and ethics (duty) can draw from—which is the proposal of this article—the ethical vision of Lonergan, fundamentally developed in two of his most relevant works: *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1999) and *Method in Theology* (1988).

This author's ethical proposal is based on the observable fact that throughout human experiences, we are continually making value judgments that guide our decision-making processes, which gradually define our personal and collective experiences. We are structurally moral beings because our intentional conscience has a dimension linked to the search for value, understood as a transcendental notion.

Exploring the process that all human beings follow to correctly make these value judgements is what sustains the possibility of ethics (Lonergan, 1999, 1988).

Lonergan's ethics is not strictly one of duty, if duty is understood as external rules or as following a preexisting axiological or deontological code. It is an ethics of profound wanting because within the most intimate part of human sentiment—understood as an intentional response to the search for value and not as a mere spontaneous sensation or reaction of like or dislike—there is a desire to undertake and live according to what

is truly constructive and good for oneself, the community, and humanity as a whole.

We are, then, faced with an ethics that stems from the analysis of the own experience of human beings as subjects that value and decide based on the desire to choose good, which is operating in their intentional conscience.

Characteristics of Human Good as a Concrete Good

According to Lonergan (1998), “Good is always concrete, but the definitions are abstract. Therefore, if one pretends to define good, one runs the risk of disorienting readers” (p. 33).

Since “good is always concrete” (p. 33) from the Lonerganian perspective, therefore, it is inseparable from a context of a social, cultural, historical, natural, spiritual, and human reality, in which the desire to choose good within the depths of every human being’s consciousness, and of humanity as a collective, is subject to limited and progressive updates.

Because of this concrete vision of human good, Lonergan resists to define it and posits instead its characteristics and components. According to the philosopher, there are seven components of human good: capabilities, feelings, values, beliefs, cooperation, progress, and decadence. These components can be understood visually like a wheel that rotates on its axis simultaneously moving forward (progress) or backwards (decadence), depending on the development or lack of development of these components.

Capabilities have to do with the development of human good. Good requires an appropriate and well-developed thought process. Feelings intervene because it is possible to value and decide based on spontaneous sensations of like or dislike or emotional states, but also—which is desirable—it can, and should, be decided from the apprehension of value that occurs in the deepest, most stable, and elaborate feelings, which are precisely understood as intentional responses to value realization.

Beliefs may, or may not, contribute to human good development because individuals possess certain ideas, values, and judgments that they consider certain and that constitute the basis on which to stand, their vital sustenance. Values obviously constitute the building of human good, except not understood as predefined concepts that are applicable in every context, but rather as a transcendental notion having to do with the answer we seek

when asking ourselves questions to deliberate. Based on these elements, a person can operate in an individual and isolated way or cooperate to build human good in a communal and social manner, responding to the demands of the concrete world that they inhabit. Progress is produced to the extent that authentic cooperation is developed —when a person is able to build authentic human good— otherwise decadence occurs —when good is obstructed or bad is generated.




Figure 1: Components of human good
From: López-Calva, 2009

The Dynamic Structure of Human Good

“What is good with respect to human good in any place or time? We distinguish three main aspects. There are also levels: the particular good... the order good and value.” (Longergan, 1998, p. 68)

In the book, *Topics in Education*, which compiles his 1956 conferences in Cincinnati, and which was published in Spanish as *Philosophy of Education* (1998), Lonergan develops what he calls the dynamic structure of human good, seen as an object under construction within history.

The starting point is the search for transcultural and transhistorical elements of human good, understood as a dynamic and complex reality under permanent historical construction. Because what transcends con-

crete cultures and times are not moral contents —values or behavioral norms of moral behavior established by society— Lonergan (1998) asserts that what is truly independent of culture and time, is the structure of good.

That structure, which is dynamic like the development of good itself, contains three interrelated levels, namely: particular good, good of order, and terminal values. According to Lonergan (1998):

Particular good is that which people think about ordinarily when one talks about good...particular good could be a thing, like a new car, or an event, such as the fact that someone comes or goes, or a satisfaction, or an operation. Particular good refers to the satisfaction of a particular appetite. It is perfectly familiar and very simple. (p. 68)

The first level of the dynamic structure of human good, the particular good, satisfies a concrete human need of any kind: biological, material, esthetic, intellectual, affective, spiritual, etc. It is transcultural and transhistorical, not because each time and culture need the same particular goods to satisfy the needs of human life, but rather because, even if different, all human societies of any time and cultural horizon need certain particular goods to develop. Lonergan (1998) asserts:

The concrete way to truly exercise cooperation is what we call the good of order. This good is different from particular goods, but it is not separated from them. Nonetheless, it considers these goods, not in an isolated way and referring to the individual they satisfy, but it considers them altogether and with the characteristic of being recurrent. (p. 53)

The second level of the structure is the good of order, which goes beyond particular goods because it is the cooperative structure that is needed to guarantee a systematic and generalized flow of particular goods. The good of order is, then, the concrete social organization through which one seeks for a constant satisfaction of everyone's particular needs. Lonergan (1998) suggests:

We must insist that the good of order is not utopian, or a theoretical ideal, or a group of ethical precepts, or a code of laws, or a kind of super-institution. It is about something very concrete. It is the good or bad functioning of the group of relationships of the "if...then"-type that guides operators that coordinate operations. (p. 54)

We must once again point out that the transcultural and the transhistorical is not a type of organization or social cooperation, therefore the good of order is not a utopia or an ideal nor is it a type of economic-political-social system. What goes beyond every historical context and every cultural nuance is not the content of the concretion of the good of order,

but the mere need for the existence of a certain type of organization and a specific level of cooperation that looks to ensure the ordered and systematic flow of all particular goods. Lonergan (1998) indicates:

The third element of the invariant structure of the human good is value. They are not only structures, but people ask: is the structure good? It is said: "It is not their fault, it is the structure"...The question of which precisely needs to be the good of order that works concretely and determines the customs, the institutions, the material equipment, the social personal position of every aspect of their lives—the total human good of order— posits the question of value: is this good of order? (p. 72).

The third level of the structure of human good is value. This level has to do with the critical question around what is truly good at the particular and at the order level. Which are the true particular goods to construct a human value that is worth it? To what extent should they be owned and how should the particular goods be used? Which should the appropriate good of order be? Which good of order guarantees the human development of every member of society?

It is at this third level, where the meanings of what is truly good at the particular and social levels begin to intertwine. It is where a conscience of good is configured at an individual, community, or societal level.

This level explains the creation of human communities as understood by Lonergan (1988) as groups of people that share meanings and values.

The transcultural and transhistorical elements at this level of human good are not found in given coinciding terminal values sought by all independently of the time they inhabit, but rather in that at any time and in every culture, people and groups ask critically about the true particular goods and authentic good of order that will take them to a progressive and always limited construction of an individual existence and a social organization that can be truly called human.

The dynamic structure of human good is open because its contents is "not specified" (Lonergan, 1988, p. 75) beforehand. It refers to an invariant structure because it is present in every human society, but its contents are not previously established or known once and for all.

On the other hand, the three levels of structure are interrelated in such a way that each one is influenced by and influences the others.

In the same way that there are particular goods, there are particular evils: privations, suffering, damage, destruction. But, as occurs with the good of order, particular evils can also become chronic; there can be

a scheme of recurrence which works for them such that, if they occur, they will occur over and over again. A criminal wave, a depression, a war...they are organized structures that maintain the recurrence of evils. (Lonergan, 1998, p. 79).




Figure 2. The structure of human good. From: López-Calva, 2009.
Source: López-Calva (2009)

In Lonergan’s ethical stance, good, by definition, is not separated from evil. Also, as there are particular goods, there are particular evils. It refers to things, people, actions, habits, etc., which, instead of satisfying actual human needs, deepen human being’s shortcomings or create new artificial needs that turn into destructive elements in the construction of our own existence. Suffering, destruction, hunger, spiritual void, heartbreak, are all particular evils that undoubtedly exist in the world at any time and, perhaps, with a special potency in today’s world.

In the same way that particular goods need to be recurrent and flow systematically for all members of a society, unjust structures can also be constructed, as well as distorted. For example, institutions or governments that instead of seeking the common good, become obstacles to that goal. Thus, the good of order is countered by the structural evil as an organization that regenerates particular evils.

There is a permanent tension between particular goods and particular evils, consequently there is a constant tension between the tendency toward good of order and the tendency toward structural bad.

In addition, in the third level, there is a correspondence between values and evil as a distortion or aberration of culture, in other words, evil as a collective blindness evading the critical question for the true good and denying to value what is truly valuable. It refers to a level of deviation that begins to build up and deepen throughout generations until it reaches a moment when good and evil are confused; hence, what is destructive for

individual and collective existence is valued as good. As stated by Lonergan (1988), “The corrupted spirits have an instinctive ability to choose the wrong solution and to insist that it is the only intelligent, reasonable, and good one” (p. 59).

Thus, societal decadence is produced through a very slow process, which is very complicated to reverse. In a corrupted society, no one—or very few, which are always those ignored or rejected—is capable of seeing which is the true solution to humanization’s problems.

The Human Good and Research Practices in Education

The ethics proposed by Lonergan can help understand and solve the problem of the relationship between ethics and educational research in the dimension of research practices. It elicits elements to train ethical researchers and develop capabilities that support knowledge building through ethically valid processes. First, referring to components of human good, because they exist in that wheel that turns and goes forward or back with elements that can guide these training processes.

Regarding these components, the training of ethical educational researchers would have to stem from developing thinking capabilities that are appropriate for researchers to critically analyze their problematization processes; formulation of questions and goals; choosing theoretical frameworks and methodological paradigms; designing survey processes, instruments, and data collecting procedures; and proper forms of presenting results and conclusions.

On the other hand, the formulation of all of these elements would be more aligned with ethics if researchers in training were more aware of the beliefs implicit in their scientific choices and how they conduct their research. Making continuously explicit and critically reflecting about one’s own beliefs with respect to education and research may aid in generating future researchers’ ethical habits that are well-rooted and freely chosen.

The emotional dimension is also part of the solution to train ethical researchers. Adequate emotional education will help researchers in training distinguish between spontaneous emotions from mood swings and those responding to value apprehensions in their research processes. Habituating oneself to choose that which is a product of value-driven apprehensions and not from spontaneous feelings is key to generating ethically valid research.

Value guidance, in other words, the development of the capability to pose good questions to deliberate during all phases of the research process

is another dimension of researchers' training, which is fundamental to solving the problem of ethics in educational research. As Camacho (2005) asserts, professional ethics is, ultimately, a question for deliberation and not a series of answers expressed in deontological codes.

Finally, capacity development and an attitude of cooperation instead of isolationist habits is another fundamental element for the training of future researchers and the reorientation of current researchers' work.

A continuous attitude to analyze elements of progress or decadence generated from one's own and others' research is, in short, the element that can show an adequate training as an educational researcher. This corresponds to the components of human good as generators of dimensions for the training of future researchers and the transformation of active researchers.

Now, addressing the levels of the dynamic structure of human good, it is also possible to find theoretical tools to rethink and address the problem of unethical procedures in research. It becomes evident that this is a problem of particular goods, in other words, negative actions taken by concrete researchers or research teams without considering ethical norms during their research or intentionally manipulating processes, data, or subjects to achieve pragmatic or economically established goals.

However, not all ethical problems in terms of procedures are attributable to people and groups, in other words, to the particular level of evil. Referring to the second level of the human good structure, it is possible to find that regarding the problem of noncompliance of professional ethics in educational research, there also exist structural causes that must be addressed. To a great extent, the problem of ethics disarticulation in research is related to the organizational system of production and dissemination of scientific knowledge in current capitalist societies, where knowledge has become another form of merchandise.

Thus, there are many elements in the institutional organization of production and dissemination of knowledge that cause the unethical conducts or ethically questionable actions in researchers and teams. Indeed, to face and solve the problem of professional ethics in educational research, it is not enough to exhort researchers to follow codes of conduct generated along the way. It also requires, simultaneously, the analysis and transformation of how researchers are encouraged to generate and disseminate knowledge, which in many instances responds to a market logic of supply and demand and at its core, lies the conception of separating factual and value judgements. This is what continuously regenerates unethical conducts.

In the third level of the structure, it is also necessary to analyze unethical conducts from the framework of the dominant scientific culture. If

this culture becomes permissive, as is referred by Hirsch (2012) and other authors, it is possible to find a cause of unethical or ethically questionable conducts. This culture does not reject, view certain behaviors as negative, and even encourages productivity demands that the system is posing as a fundamental criterion to evaluate researchers' work.

The Human Good and the Reorientation of Educational Research Goals

The dynamic structure of the human good also allows to analyze the relationship between professional ethics and educational research from the second problematic dimension posited in this work, in other words, research goals. Additionally, it is possible and necessary to analyze the research goals according to the three levels of said structure.

At the particular level, the application of this theoretical contribution by Lonergan (1988, 1999) would allow to conduct research that studies the particular motivations of researchers and groups regarding knowledge creation. What is the goal that researchers aim for with their research? Is it about the mere earning of income, prestige and power, the external goods that Cortina (2000a) refers to or is there an actual goal to contribute to the betterment of societal life?

At the good of order or structural evil levels, this theoretical contribution proposes elements to analyze the system of promotion and evaluation of research in contemporary society by determining the goals that are implicit or explicit in this system. Does it refer to a system that simply seeks to stimulate knowledge building for business or does it truly aim at generating dynamic knowledge building in every aspect of human and social life? Is the goal of the knowledge generation and dissemination system simply to contribute to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth or is the goal the comprehensive construction of societal human good?

At the third level of the structure, human good understood as value or as cultural aberration, Lonergan's contribution can lead to the analysis of concrete scientific cultures in terms of their goals. What are the meanings and values that are guiding the activity of a country's researchers? Which elements of the scientific culture are contributing to the authentic and complex goal of educational researchers? Which to generate knowledge for the comprehension and continuous transformation of processes and educational systems? Which with the goal of improving the quality of life of future generations? Which elements of this scientific culture are oriented more toward achieving economic and personal benefits for researchers and funders?

Conclusions

The relationship between professional ethics and educational research has to be rethought and reactivated if we want the research on educational knowledge generation to contribute to build processes and educational systems that are more relevant in human and social terms, in other words, toward the improvement of quality of life of future generations and toward the construction of truly just and democratic societies.

To move forward toward rearticulating, it is crucial to not only perform empirical research, but also research regarding theoretical development that allows finding elements to better understand this relationship and discover the dimensions and aspects that need to be considered.

The problem of the relationship between professional ethics and educational research —scientific research in general— has a double dimension: on the one hand, it is about analyzing and reverting unethical or ethically questionable conducts that are invading the realm of research. On the other hand, it is also crucial not to remain in the field of ethically invalid conducts and procedures, but rather to analyze and reorient the goals of educational research in a context of a global market that has turned knowledge, its building and dissemination process, into one more merchandise-producing industry.

In this process, that (Brunner and Tillet (2005) have called marketization, the goal of knowledge building moves toward pragmatism and a productivity vision, often displacing ethical considerations to a secondary role.

To appropriately tackle this double-dimension problem and achieve understanding and dynamize the relationship between professional ethics and educational research, Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan's (1988, 1998, 1999) theoretical contribution on ethics of human realization is very useful. Specifically, his notion of human good and its components and, especially, the dynamic structure of human good as an object under construction.

The components of human good —capabilities, beliefs, feelings, value, cooperation, progress, and decadence— bring important elements for the training of new researchers with an ethical perspective and for the transformation of current researchers to be able to reintegrate professional ethics into their work.

The dynamic structure of human good brings elements to think about unethical conducts and ethically questionable conducts from a complex perspective that does not stay at the particular level, creating responsible researchers or groups, but that progresses toward a structural analysis —

good of order and value, which are causes that are regenerating this type of behaviors in the current scientific community.

On the other hand, this structure of human good brings elements to understand and rethink the goals of educational research in today's world, checking whether educational researchers' particular motivations, the systemic orientation and organization, and scientific culture are oriented toward the search for social good or economic growth.

Adopting a vision of the dynamic structure of human good as a tool for analysis of the relationship between professional ethics and educational research may help build a very solid analytical and interpretative framework enabling us to comprehend and transform the reality of current educational research, where the separation of factual judgement, which corresponds to knowledge, and value judgement, which corresponds to ethics, seems to prevail.

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