Revista Folios
Universidad Pedagógica Nacional
Connections between
Theory and Practice of Music in Augustine
Conexões entre
teoria e prática
da música em Agostinho
Conexiones entre
teoría y práctica
de la música en Agustín
Para citar este artículo: Prada-Dussán, M. (2024). Connections between Theory and Practice of Music in Augustine. Folios, (59), 224-232. https://doi.org/10.17227/folios.59-13468
1 Abstract
This article explores two types of connection between theory and practice of music in Augustinian philosophical thought. On
a first account, during the early writings of this African author, especially in the dialogue De Musica, there is a disconnection
between musical and the practice of music, in the sense that, while the former leads human beings to the spiritual, the latter
fosters us to stay in the material realm. In his later writings, for example, in Enarrationes in Psalm, Augustine describes the
practice of music through his sign theory, forming the second account of connection. In such description, he points out that the
semantic content of the musical signs is done at the same time, being pragmatic. In this way, the rational encounter of what
music actually means is transformed into practice: in the convergence of theory and practice of music. Finally, the article was
made as a result of the doctoral research in Philosophy in Complutense University of Madrid.
Keywords
Saint Augustine; music; sign theory; musical science.
2 Resumo
Este artigo explora dois tipos de relações entre a teoria e a prática da música no pensamento filosófico de Agostinho.
Nas suas primeiras obras, especialmente no diálogo De Música, durante os escritos deste filósofo africano, existe uma
desconexão entre a teoria e a prática musical, no sentido de que, enquanto a primeira conduz os indivíduos para o aspecto
espiritual, a prática musical os ancora no mundo material. Em seus escritos posteriores, por exemplo, em Enarrationes in
Psalm, Agostinho descreve a prática da música por meio de sua teoria dos signos, formando a segunda relação de conexão.
Nesse quadro, ele enfatiza que o conteúdo semântico dos signos musicais não apenas carrega significado ao mesmo tempo,
mas também serve a um propósito pragmático. Nesse sentido, a compreensão racional da importância da música passa
por uma transformação rumo à prática: no alinhamento entre teoria e prática musical. Finalmente, o artigo é resultado da
pesquisa de Doutorado em Filosofia, cursado na Universidade Complutense de Madri.
Palavras-chave
Santo Agostinho; música; teoria dos signos; ciência da música.
3 Resumen
Este artículo explora dos tipos de relaciones entre la teoría y la práctica de la música en el pensamiento filosófico de Agustín. En sus obras tempranas, especialmente en el diálogo De Musica, durante los escritos de este filósofo africano, existe una desconexión entre la teoría y la práctica musical, en el sentido que, mientras el primero guía a los individuos hacia el ámbito espiritual, la práctica musical los ancla en el mundo material. En sus escritos posteriores, por ejemplo, en Enarrationes in Psalm, Agustín describe la práctica de la música a través de su teoría de los signos, formando la segunda relación de conexión. En este marco, él enfatiza que el contenido semántico de los signos musicales no solo lleva significado al mismo tiempo, cumple un propósito pragmático. En este sentido, la comprensión racional de la importancia de la música experimenta una transformación hacia la práctica: en la alineación entre la teoría y la práctica musical. Finalmente, el artículo es resultado de investigación de Doctorado en Filosofía, cursado en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
Palabras clave
San Agustín; música; teoría de los signos; ciencia musical.
4 Introduction
From the beginning of his intellectual work until his
last writings, Augustine of Hippo became interested
in reflecting on music. Though he referred to these
matters in a systematic way only in his early works,
which is the case of the dialogues De Ordine (386)
and De Musica (390), some allusions, remarks, and
musicological and philosophical descriptions about
these subjects are found throughout his last works,
particularly in Confessionum (397-401), De Doctrina
Christina (397-427), De Civitate Dei (412-427), and
Enarrationes in Psalms (392-420).
Even though the subject of music was a great
concern for this African author all throughout his
literary production, this does not entail that his
approach was always rooted from the same pers-
pective. On the contrary, Augustine approached the
matter from two different theoretical frameworks:
on one hand, in the early writings, he understood
music through the distinction between musical
science and practical music, embedded in the
definition of the Liberal Arts. On the other hand,
in subsequent writings, he became interested in
studying practical music under his sign theory.
Both perspectives describe the manner in
which human beings can reach the spiritual world
through music (i.e., the anagogic function of music).
According to the first, by unfolding the musical
science, reason captures the immaterial structures
that lie beneath any material organization of sounds;
and in accordance with the second, human beings
access immaterial world through the musical signs
and their meanings.
This change in the perspective from which music
is analyzed conveys, at the same time, a change
in the manner in which music accomplishes its
anagogic function. This is why, in this paper, I want
to show that the change in the approach to music
also activates a different way for establishing the
relation between theory and practice. In that way, I
will show specifically that, from the first perspective,
music performs an anagogic function only through
reasoning; whereas from the second, such function
is also accomplished in the musical practice. In fact, based on the sign theory, Augustine understands
that musical practice is, by itself, a practice of virtues
that is part of the path towards a superior world.
Moreover, I will develop this argument in three different sections. In the first one, I will make a brief description of the anagogic function of the theory of music, within the outline of the Liberal Arts; in the second one, I will show how the emission of a sign finds its justification in charity, centered on the Augustinian sign theory; and, in the third one, I will focus on the way Augustine describes the musical practices through the sign theory and how they are associated to charity.
5 The musical science
In the dialogues De Musica and De Ordine,
Augustine describes the way in which human beings
access to the spiritual world by means of music. He
defines this process within the neoplatonic coor-
dinates as the return of the soul towards its origin,
to the One, to God. The path follows the general
sequence that begins with a sensitive contact with
the material world and walks in the direction to the
immaterial world: Per corporalia ad incorporalia. In
this transit, he distinguishes between two types of
music: practical music, which consists in the use,
delight, and emission of sounds (material aspect
of music); and theoretical music, which deals with
the rational study of the stable and immaterial
structures that organize sounds in such a way that
they constitute a beautiful work. Augustine carefully
examines the latter, since it takes him closer to the
immaterial world.
Augustine defines the musical science in the following manner: “Musica est scientia bene modulandi” (De mus. I.II.2). In the dialogue De Musica, he analyzes one by one the components of the definition11 1 Augustine dedicates the first part of the first book De Musica to the analysis of the definition (De mus. i. ii. 3 — vi. 12) and shows the reasons or proportions (i.e., mathematical harmony) that make the musical works beautiful and the principle from which they start, the principle of unity. Moreover, he shows how the discovery of such proportions and principles fulfills the function of encouraging the soul to return to such fields. We can break down this development into the following steps:
-
1.
From metrics to mathematics: a) reduction of metrical figures (duration of words) into rhythmical figures (numeric measures of duration), b) discovery of mathematical proportions between durations, and c) discovery that beauty lies under the proportions of equality which, at the time, have origin in the unity;
-
2.
Discovery of the presence of numbers and proportion in the human soul (interiority);
-
3.
Discovery of a transcendent principle of a unit inside the soul, as a principle that allows perceiving and understanding the entities as a unit and as aesthetic objects able to produce beauty.
This path illustrates the anagogic function
fulfilled by music. The first step shows disdain for
the material world and the elevation from sounds
towards numbers; consequently, the step two shows
the path of interiority that is necessary to find the
origin of the principles of beauty; lastly, the step
three shows the encounter with the unity, a transcendent principle that operates as a condition of
possibility in the constitution of every single entity
as it is, as well as the aesthetic experience as a means
to perceive —remember, produce, achieve— every
object as one and as beautiful.
Let us specify two characteristics of this path. On
one side, in this outline, beauty has a rational structure: the unit is a mathematical-ontological structure,
and harmony is displayed in numerical sequences.
Beauty does not have content; it is postulated as
rational restrictions, as organization criteria.22
2
For this, Ellsmere, P.K., and La Croix, R. (1988) state that the Augus-
tinian aesthetic music has a formal type.
By virtue of the rational character of music,
the musician discovers the structures of beauty
by means of the use of reasoning. Though beauty
can be experienced by the sensitivity under the mode of pleasurable experience, the encounter
with the last principle is always of a rational type.
Only the rational encounter of this principle may
be used as a reliable criterion for the organization
of sound matter, and only this encounter provides
long lasting happiness.
A musician is, in this vein of thought, the per-
son who has an intelligible world by perspective,
development and occupation: he is the individual
immersed in the intelligibility and he is the one in
charge of musical theory, of the science. Therefore,
he is closer to the truth and eternity. On the other
hand, instrumentalists and singers are those who
set their attention on the material world, on the
emission of sounds. Then, the musical practice must
be transcended, even abandoned, if one does not
want to take the risk of falling into a disorganized
delight. They are in an ontological world different
from the intelligible realm; which is why they are
not valued in the ascending process to the superior
world. The musicians are close to being humanized,
as they become close to the rational and intelligible
world, whereas instrumentalists and singers end up
being comparable to animals, since they renounce
such immateriality (De mus. i. iv. 6).
Furthermore, it could be said that, even though
the principle of beauty is transcendent, human
beings find it in their interior, in their soul. The
anagogic path that is transited through the musical
science is, then, a path of interiority, whose goal is
the contemplation of the interior unity. Despite the
fact that this principle is in the soul, it is universal,
which means that it exists, it can be reached, and it
is shared by all of mankind. However, the anagogic
path displayed in the musical science is an individual path; this is, it neither involves nor implies the
participation of others in each musician’s journey.
The other human beings might appear only as
interlocutors in the dialectical reasoning practice
embedded in the process of returning to interiority.
Nevertheless, in the musical science outline, the anagogic function is achieved through the road of dialectic-rational display until the interior contem-plation of rational beauty principles is achieved. The practical music is appointed either as a departure point of the road, since in its pleasure is experienced, or as an object in which the rational principles are all applied. There are no signs that show that this setting accomplishes by itself an anagogic function.
6 The Locutio in the framework of the sign theory
Augustine points out that a sign by itself is a material
thing (res) that directs those who perceive it towards
something different from themselves, towards a
meaning: “Signum est enim res, praeter speciem
quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens
in cogitationem venire” (De doctr. Chr. ii.i.1). Now,
besides the existence of signs that are not produced
with an intention, human beings produce signs with
the purpose of expressing outwardly an interior
knowledge, a content of the soul, thus somebody
else can know it. The porpoise of signs is to show
something outwardly (docere): “Nec ulla causa est
nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depro-
mendum et traiciendum in alterius animum id quod
animo gerit is qui signum dat” (De doctr. Chr. ii.i.1).33
3
Agustine distinguihes between natural signs (naturalia) and data
(data).The former are those that appear without being produnced
volunteerly, like smoke from fire; the latter are produced with an
intention (De doctr. Chr. ii.i.1).
To understand the character attributed to musical practice under the sign theory, it is necessary
to go deeper into the decisive justification of sign
emission (locutio) since it is in this domain where
the search for beauty becomes action. Then, it is
necessary for Augustine to justify the intention
of —the motivation— for letting others know what
we have inside.
Beyond merely having the locutio serve as a
support for social organization, the justification
given by Augustine starts by considering the sign’s
role in the process of knowledge, until they reach
the realm of the ethical need. It is in this realm that
they find the foundation for their emissions.
If we take into account the skeptical criticism,
which states that nothing is ever learned by means
of the signs (Sexto Empírico, 1997, i.iv.38), some
critics question Augustine about the need for the
emission of signs with the purpose of achieving
knowledge. If nothing can be learned from the
signs, what is the sign useful for in this process? (De
doctr. Chr, Prologue, 6) In De Magistro Augustine
outlines that, even though nothing can be learned
by means of the signs, these cause individuals to
remember (commemorare) and incite them to look
for the unknown; both movements advance toward
the interior, where the truth can be found. In this
way, the knowledge achieved by means of the signs
constitutes, as referred by Rist (1944), a second-hand
knowledge, prior to that given first-hand, which is
the one obtained by direct vision, by divine illumination (Rist, 1994, p. 31).
Nevertheless, the matter is not clear yet, since
the critics indicate that if knowledge is eventually
reached by illumination, this is, by an interior
vision of the divine word, then the signs might
not be required whatsoever. In the terms that such
discussion is held, the critics ask: Why does not God
reveal knowledge to human beings directly instead
of confusing them in linguistic, social, and cultural
structures that, though having been erected with
this goal, are not enough in the end? (De doctr. Chr,
Prologue, 6).
The context and the terms in which this subject
is settled force us to go into sign arguments and
descriptions, supported by the Jewish-Christian
root assumed by Augustine. As Pollman points out,
the Augustinian treatment of the signs is not only
supported in its skeptic and stoic heritage, but also
takes elements from this other mentioned tradition
(Pollman, 2005, p. 16).
Augustine accepts that God might have settled
the human condition in such a way that knowledge
would not have been mediated by the communicative acts among human beings; however, he proposes
that, even though God could have established it in
this manner, He preferred that human mediation
exist in this process, “Et poterant utique omnia per
angelum fieri, sed abiecta esset humana condicio si per
homines hominibus Deus verbum suum ministrare
nolle videretur” (De doctr. Chr, Prologue, 6). Hence,
the question is addressed to inquire why the human
mediation (ministrare) is relevant; in short, why
the locutio is relevant: the act of communicating,
learning and teaching one another.
After failing to find a decisive justification in a
theory of knowledge, Augustine’s answer is displaced
into the ethical domain. The reason for this is, says
the African author, that if there was no exchange of
signs among human beings there would not be place
for charity: “Deinde ipsa caritas, quae sibi homines
invicem nodo unitatis astringit, non haberet aditum
refundendorum et quasi miscendorum sibimet
animorum, si homines per homines nihil discerent”
(ibid). After all, the decisive reason of the locutio is
that charity emerges in it, and the signs, at the same
time manifest this. Charity, as Augustine outlines,
motivates us to confess what we hold in the inside
(De f. et symb. i.1; C. mendacium. vi. 14).
The above mentioned is one of the ways in which Augustine develops the idea according to which there would be a necessary and reciprocal relationship between truth and charity,44 4 Relationship that has its origin in the Holy Trinity (De Trin. ix-xi; xv) in such a way that one follows the other. To find the truth and the desire to live in it, is something that leads us mandatorily to live the charity; on the other hand, only by way of charity may the truth be achieved. In fact, Augustine understands that God is reached, not only by interior contemplation, but also by charity practice. Therefore, after finding the truth in the interior, the next step is to put it into practice, by means, for example, of the emission of signs —among other ways to experience charity.55 5 The book The Faith and the other works as well as Of the Spirit and the letter are oriented to show that faith works through love. It is a recurring theme in Augustine (De. f. et symb.i. 1ss; De f. et op. xiv. 21; xxii. 40) Such a link simultaneously is a fruit of the Trinity unity (De Trin. Books ix, x, xi; xv). A sign expresses outwardly what we have in our interior. Such expression is, by itself, an expression of charity. The emergence of charity allows Augustine to distinguish between two types of using the signs: either to govern or dominate others or to help them reach the spiritual world.
7 Musical signs in the relation between theory and practice
Allusions to the symbolism of musical instruments appear in the Augustinian texts at the
beginning of the decade of 392, in the commentary
about Psalm 32. Though it had been announced
since that year, the inclusion of music in the conceptual domain was done afterwards, approximately
in 397 in Confesssionum and in the first books of
De Doctrina Christiana. However, the strongest
description of this sort is found in the period ranging from 410 to 416, when he develops the subject
of the symbolism of instruments and vocal forms
through the exercise of commenting on the psalms
34, 46, 67, 72, 87, 91, 99, 103, 105, 106, 122, 123,
130, 137, 143, 146, 148, 149, and 150. With such
developments, Augustine is inscribed, at the time,
in the patristic tradition that interprets the biblical
text and, within this framework, attempts to define
a sense and kind of relationship of the believer with
the musical matter.66
6
The religious allegorism of music has been widely described by the
academics of this period. In this respect, the studies by Theodore
Gèrold (1973), Solange Corbin (1962) and James Mckinnon (1968)
are a good source of work. See references of this work.
In Enarrationes in Psalms, Augustine analyses
the musical signs from a double relationship: sig-
nifier-signified (semantic function of signs) and
signs-agents (pragmatic function). In this way, in
a first exercise, he presents the meaning of musical
signs (organ, flutes, drums, zither, psaltery), some
forms (chants oh hymns, psalms and alleluias) and
vocal structures (the choir). Similarly, he indicates
the utility of instrument practice and singing and
the relation that must be established between them
and those who listen and execute them. In this
second relationship, he highlights the description
of forms and vocal structures, since these are the
most used in liturgy (Mckinnon, 1965, p. 5). For
this reason, in this writing, I will briefly focus on
these last elements. I will attempt to show that the
description of the signified (semantic function)
implies an experience of who participates in the
singing (pragmatic function).
Augustine took part in the Ambrosian hymns singing practice. Afterwards he took time to describe and define them:
Hymnus scitis quid est? Cantus est cum laude Dei. Si laudas Deum, et non cantas, non dicis hymnum: si cantas, et non laudas Deum, non dicis hymnum: si laudas aliud quod non pertinet ad laudem Dei, etsi cantando laudes, non dicis hymnum. Hymnus ergo tria ista habet, et cantum, et laudem, et Dei. (Enarr. in. psalm. 148. 17)
In this definition, it may be observed that the
conditions under which a hymn is defined are not
technical, but rather they refer to an inner experience. In this way, the exterior sign, the hymn, is
constituted by an internal state. The sign expresses
such state. Therefore, singing the hymn is the expression of the adherence to a faith and the intention to
let it know (praise).
The Alleluia chant provides an additional ele- ment. As described by Augustine, the most relevant musical characteristic of this chant consists in prolonging in a melisma form the last letter “a” of the word alleluia.77 7 In music a melisma is referred as the prolonged singing of a vowel. This prolongation or iubilatio manifests interior happiness:
Qui iubilat, non verba dicit, sed sonus quidam est laetitiae sine verbis: vox est enim animi diffusi laetitia, quantum potest, exprimentis affectum, non sensum comprehendentis. Gaudens homo in exsultatione sua, ex verbis quibusdam quae non possunt dici et intellegi, erumpit in vocem quam- dam exsultationis sine verbis; ita ut appareat eum ipsa voce gaudere quidem, sed quasi repletum nimio gaudio, non posse verbis explicare quod Gaudet. (Enarr. in. psalm. 99. 4)
Such happiness would not be a psychological but
rather an ontological state: The happiness of the individual, who finds the truth and dwells on it, lives the
present existence anticipating the future life. In this
context, it is the experience of life through hope.
The alleluia chant is the expression of one who lives
the hope of a future life of perpetual joy (Enarr. in. psalm. 123. 3). For such joy, there are no meaningful
words, thus it can be expressed only through a vowel.
On the other side, the psalm is described by
Augustine as the chant in which, apart from con-
fessing the truth made by the mouth when singing,
the confession is also made through the works:
“quicumque manibus operatur opera bona, psallit
Deo; quicumque ore confitetur, cantat Deo. Canta ore,
psalle operibus” (Enarr. in. psalm. 91. 3). Psalm and
psaltery chants make up one single unit in human
life, as constituted by the truth that dwells on the
inside and the works carried out on the outside by
virtue of charity. The two elements, faith and charity,
are necessary, both in the way that adherence to
truth leads to charity works, and in the way that
works must be supported by faith: “Caeterum qui
non habent caritatem, portare psalterium possunt,
cantare non possunt” (Enarr. in psalm.143. 16.).
The descriptions about the psalms insist that the
adherence to the truth implies the practice of charity.
The choir is, eventually, a unity sign based on
charity: “Chorus est consensio cantantium. Si in choro
cantamus, concorditer cantemus. In choro cantantium
quisquis voce discrepuerit, offendit auditum, et per-
turbat chorum” (Enarr. in. psalm. 149. 7).
Let us examine this subject. The choir is a structure
where all the members become one in the chant, where
they achieve harmony. However, it is not Augustine’s
concern to define what this unity and harmony are
from a technical-musical point of view. On the contrary, his descriptions are again made in the domain of
the signified. In this way, the choir unity and harmony
mean that the singers have the same idea in their
inside: unity is the unity of what exists in the soul; such
shared idea is signified by means of the choir chant.
On the other hand, the commentary to Psalm
87 points out that the singers’ idea that must be
shared in order to have unity and harmony in the
chant. Like in The city of God, where the only city
where harmony would exist is the one grounded on
charity, the only unity that entails harmony in the
choir is the one offered by charity: “Chorus autem
concordiam significat, quae in caritate consistit”
(Enarr. in ps. 87. 1).
As we have highlighted, the signs are emitted
in a way that others can know the internal truths.
With this, there is participation in the choir, thus
others know what the chant means. But this meaning is, at the same time, a life experience. Love is
signified in it, but only by loving can one participate
in it. Therefore, in the choir, the signified becomes
practice. The signified charity becomes practice
in the music. The expressed sense is a lived sense;
the semantic content becomes pragmatic content88
8
In this regard, Cameron (2001, p. 458) points out that “The psaltery
is not only informative but also performative”..
Under this premise, Augustine exhorts the listeners
to live the psalm chant: “et si [psalmo] orat psalmus,
orate; et si gemit, gemite; et si gratulatur, gaudete; et si
sperat, sperate; et si timet, timete. Omnia enim quae
hic conscripta sunt, speculum nostrum sunt” (Enarr.
in ps. 30. ii. iii. 1.). The musical practice is, in brief,
a type of sign whose meaning is embedded in the
execution per se. Therefore, for such vocal forms
to appear, it is necessary that those who chant have
once experienced faith, hope, and charity; and, at
the same time, live up to these practical demands
of the virtues —in this case, the chant.
In this way, musical practice is no longer a source of pleasure, nor is it the place that must be proclaimed by external rational principles. It goes beyond that; it is the expression, per se, of the content of the soul. It is the realization of what the soul has internally achieved. Internal content and external practice become necessarily merged.
8 Provisional Conclusions
Let us close this paper emphasizing the possibilities
that sign theory, applied to the liturgical chant,
opens concerning music’s anagogic function.
The first outline states that theoretical music is
the only one that can take human beings closer to
the spiritual world and that this is done through interiority. The external direction, towards the practice,
would consist in pointing out that he, who has found
the principles of beauty, arranges his musical practice moved by the principle of the rational unity. In this context, though there is a connection between
the exterior and the interior, where the former is
a manifestation of the latter, the movement to the
external world is not conceived under an anagogic
function but merely as an arrangement of the inferior world in alignment with what is superior.
The second perspective brings in a new element:
since the chant expresses charity and is charity in practice, it opens a way or road to reach God. Therefore,
aside from the necessary encounter with the truth, an
external path is required on the anagogic road; charity
put into practice: the musical practice. Contemplation
and action come together, and the exterior and interior
paths join under this function. Thus, the musical
practice acquires here new sense and value.
This opening embodies a change for the agents
that intervene in music. While in the first outline, the
musician, as the one dedicated to theory, was
the only one able to return, in the second the singer,
through his practice, attains the divine. Now he is
conceived as the one who exteriorizes by means of
signs —musicals— the true interior word in order
to communicate it to others, and in that exteriori zation, he lives the signified.
Nevertheless, in the sign theory, Augustine reconciles music theory and practice. He reconciles the encounter of the interior truth with its external manifestation, moved by charity, thus both movements are conceived now as a road to the divine. This was not a subject that was included in the approach given in the Liberal Arts framework.
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